UN Women: Supporting Women Peacebuilders in Sustaining Peace
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Celebrity Media News Commentary: The Selection of the Next UN Secretary-General Enters the Real Stage of Political Negotiation
UN Secretary-General António Guterres (Celebrity Media file photo). He will step down in 2026 after completing two terms as Secretary-General.
The selection of the next United Nations Secretary-General has moved beyond the launch of procedures and entered a more substantive stage of public scrutiny. Following the first round of interactive dialogues with candidates on April 21 and 22, a second round of hearings was held on June 15 and 18. At present, six individuals nominated or supported by Member States have come into public view: former President of Chile Michelle Bachelet, Argentine Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi, former Vice President of Costa Rica Rebeca Grynspan, former President of Senegal Macky Sall, former Foreign Minister of Ecuador and former President of the UN General Assembly María Fernanda Espinosa, and Guyana’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett.
On the surface, this is a process in which candidates publicly present their visions and respond to questions from Member States and civil society. But after two rounds of hearings, what truly deserves attention is not who appeared more composed at the podium, but who can find the minimum level of consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council. The UN Secretary-General is not chosen through a public election. The candidate must first be recommended by the Security Council and then appointed by the General Assembly. In other words, public hearings allow the world to see the candidates, but closed-door consultations determine who truly has a chance to reach the final stage.
The Six Candidates






The six candidates come from different backgrounds. Some have experience as heads of state, some have long worked within the United Nations system, and others come from the fields of nuclear security, trade and development, human rights diplomacy, or small-state multilateral diplomacy. Yet almost all of them are speaking about the same issue: reforming the United Nations. That alone says a great deal. Today’s United Nations does not lack issues; it often lacks the ability to implement decisions. It does not lack principles, but when major powers are divided, it struggles to turn principles into action. Whether on war, refugees, climate, development financing, or human rights, the United Nations faces the same question: can it still truly function?
This is also the most realistic aspect of this selection process. Candidates can speak about vision, values, and reform in public hearings, but the real difficulty of the Secretary-General’s position is not proposing slogans. It is maintaining the UN’s most basic capacity for action in a deeply divided international environment. Especially when the five permanent members of the Security Council are sharply divided, the Secretary-General can neither replace major-power decision-making nor completely avoid major-power politics.
Looking at the current field of candidates, Latin America and the Caribbean have a particularly strong presence. Among the six candidates, Bachelet, Grossi, Grynspan, Espinosa, and Rodrigues-Birkett all come from Latin America or the Caribbean, while only Sall comes from Africa. The United Nations has no written rule requiring the Secretary-General to be chosen by regional rotation, but regional balance has long been an important political consideration. The large number of Latin American candidates shows that the region has significant momentum in this round of selection; however, too many candidates may also lead to divided support.
Sall represents another possible political path. As former President of Senegal and former Chairperson of the African Union, he has head-of-state experience and can also respond to Africa’s demand for greater representation. His current weakness, however, is that his nomination does not appear to show unified endorsement at the level of the entire African Union. If Latin American candidates fail to form a consensus among themselves, and African countries can consolidate a more unified position, Sall may still become an important variable in later consultations.
Among all the candidates, María Fernanda Espinosa’s remarks are especially noteworthy. She stated that the United Nations needs to “right-size responsibly.” The phrase may sound sharp and could even be understood as a call to shrink the UN. But viewed in the context of her overall remarks, what she is expressing is not the weakening of the United Nations, but the need to free it from duplication, delay, and inefficiency so that it can return to a position where it is able to deliver results.
Secretary-General Candidate María Fernanda Espinosa: Reforming the United Nations, but Not Weakening It

Espinosa has served as Ecuador’s Foreign Minister and Defense Minister, and also as President of the United Nations General Assembly. Precisely because she is familiar with the UN system, her remarks on reform sound less like complaints from an outside critic and more like reflection from within the institution. She did not avoid the declining credibility, financial pressure, and weak implementation capacity the United Nations currently faces, nor did she reduce reform to an empty slogan. What she emphasized was reducing duplication, improving efficiency, strengthening accountability, and restoring the UN’s ability to deliver results.
The subtlety of her remarks lies in her attempt to address two different concerns at the same time. For major financial contributors, the size of the UN system, overlapping programs, and high costs have long been points of criticism. For many developing countries, however, there is concern that so-called reform may ultimately become a reduction of resources, a weakening of the development agenda, or even make the United Nations more subject to the influence of a few major powers. Espinosa’s formulation seeks a path between these two concerns: the United Nations must become more effective, but it must not lose the core mission of multilateralism as a result.
María Fernanda Espinosa, photographed by Celebrity Media at IPI on September 12, 2018.
Her handling of the issue of women’s leadership is also quite careful. In more than 80 years since the founding of the United Nations, no woman has ever served as Secretary-General. Today, four of the six candidates are women, which is already symbolically significant. Espinosa also acknowledged that the international community has indeed reached a point where it should seriously consider women’s leadership. At the same time, however, she stressed that the key is not “any woman,” but “the right woman, the right leader.” In effect, this statement tells Member States and the Security Council that she wants to be seen as a candidate with governing capacity, not merely as a historical symbol.
This is exactly where the complexity of this selection process lies. The United Nations may indeed have reached the moment to choose its first female Secretary-General, and Latin America and the Caribbean clearly hold an advantage in the structure of the candidate field. But the selection of a Secretary-General has never been determined by moral appeals, regional rotation, or personal credentials alone. Whether a candidate can ultimately pass the test still depends on whether he or she can be accepted simultaneously by the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France.
Bachelet’s situation illustrates this point. She has heavyweight credentials as a former president and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and she also enjoys high international recognition. But the heavier the political profile, the more controversy it may bring. Human rights issues are inherently sensitive for major powers, especially when a candidate’s past public positions are reexamined by different blocs. What appears to be an advantage may also become a burden.
Grossi represents another type of candidate. He has long led the International Atomic Energy Agency and has had high visibility on issues such as the Iran nuclear file and the safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. His strengths are technocratic governance and crisis diplomacy, and his image is relatively pragmatic. But the UN Secretary-General must handle not only technical issues, but also development, human rights, climate, refugees, and the demands of the Global South. Whether a more technocratic candidate can build trust across a broader political agenda remains to be seen.
Grynspan’s strengths lie in development, trade, and Global South economic issues. She has long focused on development financing, economic inequality, and trade structures. For many developing countries, these issues are more closely connected to reality than abstract institutional reform. The question is whether, in an environment marked by major-power conflict and acute security crises, a development-oriented candidate can be regarded as capable of handling high-intensity political crises. This will also be part of the Security Council’s consideration.
Rodrigues-Birkett appears as a representative of small-state diplomacy and a defender of multilateralism. She emphasized the shared responsibility to preserve the United Nations as a “global force for good.” This formulation is relatively steady and may resonate with some small and medium-sized states. However, in the final screening of major-power politics, moderation does not necessarily equal advantage. Sometimes it means a candidate is easier to accept; at other times, it may suggest a lack of a distinctive breakthrough point.
Therefore, what this selection process is now entering is not merely a phase of public presentation by the candidates, but a phase of political screening within the Security Council. Public hearings have increased transparency and allowed Member States and the international public to observe the candidates’ ideas and styles. But what will truly determine the outcome is whether different parties can form a minimum political compromise around one candidate.
The test facing the next Secretary-General is also clear: he or she must not only manage a vast international institution, but also preserve the UN’s minimum capacity for action in a divided world. It is easy for reforming the United Nations to become a slogan. The real challenge is to make the UN effective, credible, and relevant again without weakening multilateralism.
After two rounds of hearings, all six candidates have tried to prove that they understand today’s crises and have the ability to advance UN reform. But from this point forward, the focus of the selection process will increasingly move away from public speeches themselves and toward the judgments, probing, and bargaining among major powers. Whether the next Secretary-General can change the United Nations first depends on whether he or she can be accepted by a deeply divided international system.
Celebrity Media file photo.
The selection and appointment process for the next Secretary-General of the United Nations has entered a critical stage. According to relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the 2025–2026 selection process will proceed under the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, and broad participation by Member States.
The appointment of the United Nations Secretary-General is conducted in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations. Under this provision, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. This means that the Security Council plays a key role in recommending candidates, while the General Assembly, representing the Member States, completes the formal appointment.
On September 5, 2025, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 79/327 on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly. Building on previous relevant resolutions, this resolution further improves the process for selecting and appointing the Secretary-General, emphasizing transparency, inclusiveness, public information on candidates, and the importance of interaction with Member States.
On November 25, 2025, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council jointly sent a letter to all Member States, formally launching the selection process for the next Secretary-General. The joint letter invited Member States to nominate candidates for Secretary-General and outlined the procedures for candidate nominations, submission of public information, interactive dialogues, and subsequent consideration.
The selection process mainly includes the following steps: the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council issue a joint letter to formally launch the process; candidates are nominated by a Member State or a group of Member States; candidates publicly submit a vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure; the President of the General Assembly holds webcast interactive dialogues with all candidates; the Security Council considers the qualifications of the candidates and recommends a candidate to the General Assembly; and the United Nations General Assembly formally appoints the Secretary-General based on the recommendation of the Security Council.
According to information published by the United Nations, the list of candidates for the post of Secretary-General is jointly maintained and regularly updated by the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. Public information includes each candidate’s name, nominating country, vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure.
Date of nomination: February 2, 2026
Nominating countries: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
Status: Chile withdrew its nomination of her on March 25, 2026.
Date of nomination: May 11, 2026
Nominating country: Antigua and Barbuda
Status: Vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure have been submitted.
Date of nomination: March 11, 2026
Nominating country: Maldives
Status: Maldives withdrew its nomination of her on March 25, 2026.
Date of nomination: November 26, 2025
Nominating country: Argentina
Status: Vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure have been submitted.
Date of nomination: March 3, 2026
Nominating country: Costa Rica
Status: Vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure have been submitted.
Date of nomination: March 2, 2026
Nominating country: Burundi
Status: Vision statement, curriculum vitae, and campaign finance disclosure have been submitted.
According to General Assembly Resolution 79/327, the President of the General Assembly will arrange webcast interactive dialogues with all candidates for Secretary-General. This arrangement requires candidates not only to submit written materials but also to face Member States and respond publicly on issues such as their governance philosophy, vision for United Nations reform, global peace and security, protection of human rights, sustainable development, and multilateral cooperation.
Since the establishment of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General, no woman has held the position. Therefore, in this new round of selection for Secretary-General, the nomination of female candidates, the principle of gender equality, and regional representation have drawn significant attention from the international community. Relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly also encourage Member States to give full consideration to gender equality and geographical fairness when making nominations.
On May 29, 2026, the President of the General Assembly transmitted a letter from the President of the Security Council, informing that the Security Council had begun the process of considering the qualifications of the candidates. This means that the selection process for Secretary-General is gradually moving from the stage of public presentation by candidates and interaction with Member States into the stage of Security Council consideration and recommendation.
The Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly announced that the second round of informal interactive dialogues with candidates for Secretary-General will be held at United Nations Headquarters in June 2026. Compared with the first round of dialogues, the second round of exchanges will focus more specifically on the candidates’ views regarding the current international situation and the future direction of United Nations reform.
According to the procedure, the Security Council will recommend a candidate for Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly after its consideration. Ultimately, the General Assembly will complete the appointment based on the recommendation of the Security Council. The next Secretary-General is expected to assume office after the end of the current Secretary-General’s term and lead the United Nations into a new five-year term.
As early as November 2025, Celebrity Media expressed its view on the emergence of a female Secretary-General: Election of the Tenth Secretary-General of the United Nations: Who Will Represent the “Perfect Number Ten” and Become the First Woman to Lead the Organization?
The selection of the Secretary-General is not merely a personnel appointment, but an institutional choice by the international community concerning the future direction of the United Nations. In an era marked by profound changes in the global order, intertwined questions of war and peace, and overlapping challenges of development and security, whether the next Secretary-General can uphold the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, strengthen trust in the multilateral system, and promote practical cooperation among Member States will directly affect the future effectiveness and credibility of the United Nations.
Celebrity Media will continue to follow the selection and appointment process for the tenth Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the latest developments involving candidates during public interactions, Member State consideration, and Security Council recommendation.
Celebrity Media special report from the Korean Society of New York: In a special exchange on the United Nations sanctions mechanism, international security, and global governance, former UN sanctions expert Dr. Jonathan Brewer answered questions from the audience on issues including the next UN Secretary-General, the role of the UN Security Council, the nuclear issues involving North Korea and Iran, sanctions monitoring mechanisms, and unilateral sanctions.
When discussing possible candidates for the next UN Secretary-General, Dr. Brewer said that among the names currently being mentioned, Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is one figure worth watching. He noted that if Grossi were to become UN Secretary-General in the future, his technical background at the IAEA and his experience in handling nuclear issues could bring professional advantages to the UN in addressing the nuclear challenges involving North Korea and Iran.




Dr. Brewer said that Grossi has long dealt with matters related to nuclear oversight, verification mechanisms, and IAEA procedures. From the perspective of technical experience, he said, Grossi’s background “would be very interesting.” He also noted that other potential candidates may not have similar technical experience in the nuclear field, but the UN system and the IAEA themselves possess substantial professional expertise, which a future Secretary-General could rely on to advance these issues.
On the issue of UN reform, Dr. Brewer said he did not have many specific comments, but he hoped to see the UN General Assembly play a more active role in matters of international peace and security. He said that, given the current lack of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council, the General Assembly may become an important platform for moving such issues forward.

An audience member asked whether the UN Security Council had become ineffective in name only, or whether its authority was declining, especially in the context of some veto-wielding countries no longer supporting sanctions against North Korea, and how the Security Council could continue to play its role.
In response, Dr. Brewer said that the Security Council still plays an important role in today’s international system because it remains the core institution through which the international community addresses issues of peace and security. He said the existence of the five permanent members makes Security Council decision-making complex, and that current divisions may be temporary, or they may last for some time.
He further noted that if the five permanent members of the Security Council are unable to reach consensus, the UN General Assembly may be able to play a more active role to some extent. He mentioned that after the work of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea came to an end, there had been discussions about establishing some kind of alternative mechanism to continue sanctions monitoring, but those ideas ultimately did not make substantive progress. He said he would like to see the General Assembly play a greater role in such matters, particularly when the Security Council is unable to provide unified leadership, by encouraging broader participation among UN member states.


Another audience member asked what role middle powers such as Australia, India, and Japan might play in multilateral sanctions monitoring, and whether Taiwan had any intention of participating. Dr. Brewer said that, if referring to existing multilateral sanctions monitoring mechanisms, Taiwan and India are not members of those mechanisms. He also said he was not aware of whether India or Taiwan had any specific plans to join such mechanisms or establish alternative arrangements.
However, he pointed out that countries such as India have significant influence in the UN General Assembly and may be able to help build momentum for alternative sanctions monitoring mechanisms, providing new impetus for sanctions implementation and oversight within the UN system.
When discussing which think tanks conduct in-depth research on sanctions involving North Korea and Iran, Dr. Brewer mentioned that the Royal United Services Institute in London has long focused on sanctions-related issues. He also noted that the Open Source Centre in London is skilled at using open-source imagery and vessel-tracking data to analyze issues such as oil shipments to North Korea and shipping activities involving Russia.
He also mentioned that in Washington, several institutions continue to focus on sanctions, nuclear nonproliferation, and North Korea, including the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Center for a New American Security, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and 38 North. He said that research capacity in this field is mainly concentrated in London and Washington, with relatively less work being done elsewhere. Some French strategic research institutions also work on sanctions, but overall, there are not many organizations worldwide that specialize in sanctions implementation and monitoring.

Regarding the relationship between U.S. unilateral sanctions and UN sanctions, an audience member noted that the U.S. Congress often turns to unilateral sanctions when it cannot find other policy tools, and asked whether this weakens the UN sanctions mechanism.
Dr. Brewer responded that unilateral sanctions are a reality that must be accepted. He said the strength of UN sanctions lies in the fact that they are collectively authorized through the Security Council. However, precisely because Security Council members must reach agreement, UN sanctions are usually set at a relatively low common standard. Many countries, after implementing Security Council sanctions, go further by adopting stricter national sanctions of their own.
He noted that the United States is particularly active in this regard and often cites Security Council sanctions as a basis within its own sanctions framework. For UN sanctions work, he said, when gathering evidence of sanctions evasion, the focus remains on Security Council sanctions themselves, rather than on sanctions imposed by the European Union or individual countries.
Dr. Brewer also said that, on the North Korea issue, both the UN mechanism and U.S. unilateral sanctions have played important roles. Because both parties in the U.S. Congress place strong emphasis on human rights in North Korea, there is a close connection between U.S. unilateral sanctions and humanitarian and human rights issues related to North Korea. He pointed out that if future denuclearization negotiations with North Korea involve sanctions relief, differences could emerge between Congress and the White House, because Congress would likely require North Korea to make major progress on humanitarian and human rights issues as one of the conditions for easing unilateral sanctions.
At the end of the Q&A session, Dr. Brewer addressed humanitarian issues. He said that Security Council sanctions documents usually mention humanitarian concerns in their preambular paragraphs, and that in recent years the UN has paid increasing attention to the humanitarian impact of sanctions implementation. The former Panel of Experts on North Korea had also dealt with such issues, and its reports usually included content related to humanitarian concerns. Questionnaires were also sent to relevant organizations in an effort to better understand the impact of sanctions on humanitarian assistance and practical implementation.
Dr. Brewer’s responses showed that, against the backdrop of divisions within the Security Council, challenges facing sanctions monitoring mechanisms, and the growing use of unilateral sanctions, how the UN maintains the authority, professionalism, and humanitarian balance of its sanctions system will remain an important issue in international security governance.

It is worth noting that Dr. Brewer’s analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Iran nuclear issue, and the UN sanctions mechanism also resonates with the recent signing of a U.S.-Iran agreement. After the U.S. President signed the relevant U.S.-Iran agreement, public attention has focused not only on whether the agreement can bring short-term de-escalation, but also on how verification, monitoring, sanctions relief, and accountability for violations will be implemented afterward.
From this perspective, the U.S.-Iran agreement is both a phased result of diplomatic negotiations and a test of the international system’s capacity for implementation. The Iran nuclear issue has long been complicated precisely because it involves not only political trust, but also highly specialized technical nuclear verification, IAEA access, the handling of enriched uranium stockpiles, the conditions for lifting sanctions, and differences among the parties in interpreting the agreement.
Dr. Brewer mentioned during the Q&A session that if Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, were to become one of the candidates for the next UN Secretary-General, his technical background in handling nuclear issues would carry special significance. The recent U.S.-Iran agreement once again shows that, on the Iran nuclear issue, political commitments must be fulfilled through technical mechanisms; at the same time, technical mechanisms cannot function effectively without international political support. Therefore, the IAEA’s professional verification work, the authorization mechanism of the UN Security Council, and the possible supplementary political role of the UN General Assembly will together influence whether the agreement can truly be implemented.
This also gives greater practical significance to Dr. Brewer’s views on the role of the UN General Assembly. If the five permanent members of the Security Council find it difficult to form a stable consensus, whether the General Assembly can provide broader political support on issues of international peace and security will become an important question for future international governance. For the U.S.-Iran agreement to move from a “signed document” to an “enforceable arrangement,” it will require not only sustained political will from both the United States and Iran, but also a transparent, credible, and verifiable oversight framework provided by international institutions.
From the perspective of sanctions, the U.S.-Iran agreement also highlights the tension between UN sanctions and U.S. unilateral sanctions. UN sanctions are usually built on multilateral consensus and tend to be more cautious in standard-setting, while U.S. unilateral sanctions are often more flexible as a policy tool and more forceful as a means of political pressure. After the agreement is signed, whether sanctions are eased, when they are eased, and under what conditions they are eased will directly affect the credibility of the agreement. If sanctions relief comes too quickly, it may raise security concerns; if it comes too slowly, it may weaken Iran’s incentive to comply. This is precisely the practical dilemma described by Dr. Brewer: multilateral sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and diplomatic negotiations can reinforce one another, but they can also constrain one another.
Therefore, the recent U.S.-Iran agreement has not ended the Iran nuclear issue; rather, it has opened a more complex phase of implementation. It reminds the international community that the truly difficult part is often not reaching a framework agreement, but establishing a verifiable, sustainable, and enforceable mechanism in an environment of limited trust. Dr. Brewer’s analysis also shows that the future interaction among the UN Secretary-General, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and major countries will continue to profoundly shape the development of nuclear proliferation and sanctions issues involving Iran, North Korea, and beyond.
